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sufficient time to have his counsel prepare his defense. The Court stated,
"[t]o do that is not to proceed promptly in the claim ... ofregulatedjustice
but to go forward with thehaste of the mob..: -34 The Court quoted, "[i]t
is vain to give the accused a day in court, with no opportunity to prepare
for it, or to guarantee him counsel without giving [counsel] any opportunity to acquaint himself with the facts or law of the case. ' 35 The Court
held, therefore, that due process required the assignment of counsel for
an otherwise incapable defendant and that that duty was not discharged
by an assignment "under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of
effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case."' 36 Even Justice
Butler, dissenting in Powell, conceded that if defendants were "denied
the right of counsel, with the accustomed incidents of consultation and
opportunity of preparation for trial.., they were denied due process
of law .... ,-37
The Powell Court's emphasis on the need for trial counsel to have
an adequate chance to prepare applies with full force to the
Commonwealth's use of unadjudicated crimes to show future dangerousness; the proof of unadjudicated crimes often, as in Gray, will
resemble a trial in and of itself. Capital defense attorneys, therefore,
should strenuously argue that any curtailment ofan adequate opportunity
for preparation will result in the same ineffective assistance that Powell
sought to prevent. Defense counsel should point out the prejudice
suffered in foregone areas of investigation, unpursued avenues of defense, and lost opportunities for the thorough use of the exculpatory
evidence itself. Indeed, think of how different Gray's penalty phase
would have been ifthe defense had known Timothy Sorrell was the prime
suspect.

However, to make later claims of prejudice more meaningful and
resounding, the defense must make Brady requests as specific and allinclusive as possible. This will help the defense to show that exculpatory
evidence that was withheld or that would have been uncovered if given
adequate time to prepare would have been material and the case likely
would have unfolded in much different fashion that it did.
In United States v. Cronic,38 the United States Supreme Court has
given defendants a guide on how to state an ineffectiveness claim
because defense counsel has been denied adequate notice. Citing Powell,
the Court held that in certain circumstances defense counsel may be so
handicapped that they could not possibly provide effective assistance of
counsel. 39 The Court stated that certain criteria were relevant to this
determination: 40 "'(1) [T]he time afforded for investigation and preparation; (2) the experience of counsel; (3) the gravity of the charge; (4) the
complexity of possible defenses; and (5) the accessibility of witnesses to
41
counsel.'
Capital defense attorneys faced with inadequate notice should
sculpt their claims in terms of Powell and Cronic,pointing out how the
lack of notice will force them to provide ineffective assistance. The
criteria announced in Cronic provide the template for crafting the
ineffective assistance claim and provide a guide for arguing the materiality of the evidence withheld.

34 Id. at 59.
35
1d. (quoting Commonwealthv. O'Keefe, 298 Pa. 169,173,148 A.
73,74-(1929)).
36
Id. at71.
37
Id. at 73-74 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added).

38 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
39
Id. at 659-660.
40
Id. at 663.
41 Id. at 652 (quoting United States v. Golub, 638 F.2d 185, 189
(10th Cir. 1980)).

Summary and analysis by:
Douglas S. Collica

CORRELL v. THOMPSON
63 F.3d 1279 (4th Cir. 1995)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Charles W. Bousman was robbed and murdered August 11,
1985 in Franklin County, Virginia. 1 Walter Milton Correll was
arrested and taken to the Roanoke City Police Department on
August 16th. Although Correll requested an attorney early into the
first interrogation that evening, his request was not honored. He
gave two incriminating statements that evening: one to a Roanoke
officer and one to Detective Overton of the Frederick County
2
Sheriff's Department, both without the benefit of counsel.
On August 18th, Correll was escorted to Appomattox, Virginia
to undergo a polygraph examination. 3 The record did not indicate

1 Correllv. Thompson, 63 F.3d 1279, 1283 (1995).
1d. at 1284.
3
Id.
2

whether Correll waived his rights before the test. During the examination, the examiner indicated to Correll that an answer indicated
deception. 4 Subsequently, Correll was transported to the Franklin
County Jail where he asked to speak with Detective Overton in order
to explain his polygraph results. 5 Correll waived his rights and gave
his third statement regarding the murder.
The two statements given by Correll on August 16th were
suppressed at trial, but the third statement following the polygraph
examination was admitted into evidence. 6 Correll waived his right
to ajury trial and was convicted of capital murder in the commission
of robbery. The judge sentenced Correll to death based on the
vileness of the crime.

4

1d. at 1287.
1d. at 1284.
6 Id. at 1284.
5
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The Supreme Court of Virginia heard Correll's appeal and
affirmed the conviction and sentence. 7 The federal district court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, however, granted Correll's petition for a writ
of habeas corpus, finding that the admission of the third statement was
8
reversible constitutional error under the Fifth Amendment. The Commonwealth appealed the issuing of the writ to the Fourth Circuit.
HOLDING
The Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in granting
Correll's petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that the third
confession violated Edwards v. Arizona 9 and was a tainted confession.
Instead, the appellate court ruled that the trial court had properly admitted
Correll's third confession and that, even if the confession was improperly
admitted, such error was harmless. 10
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I.

The Edwards claim.

The United States Supreme Court held in Edwards that an accused
11
who has invoked his right to counsel pursuant to Mirandav. Arizona
the
unless
is
provided
until
counsel
may not be questioned further
accused himself initiates further "communication, exchange, or conversation" regarding the crime. 12 Every court that reviewed Correll's
confessions readily found that Correll had unequivocally invoked his
right to counsel before he made any of the incriminating statements in
response to interrogation. Indeed, the trial court excluded the first two
confessions from the evening of August 16th. However, on the crucial
issue of whether Correll initiated the conversation leading to the third
confession, the courts differed.
In granting habeas relief, the federal district court inferred that the
government must have reinitiated the interrogation by revealing the
polygraph results because Correll wanted to explain "what went wrong."
The district court reasoned that Correll would not have known something
"went wrong" unless he had been told by government officials. The trial
court, on the other hand, found that Correll initiated the contact, a
conclusion which the Fourth Circuit found should not have been disturbed. 13

7 Id. Petitioner's writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court was denied. Correll filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the
Franklin County Circuit Court. That court granted the Commonwealth's
motion to dismiss except as to the ineffective assistance ofcounsel claim
and ordered a hearing on that claim. The judge ultimately dismissed
Correll's petition, the Virginia Supreme Court denied his appeal, and the
United States Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari.
Correll filed a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court. As part
of his federal habeas petition in federal district court, Correll argued that
he was denied the effective assistance of counsel for counsel's failure to
adequately investigate the events surrounding the third confession. The
federal district court of the eastern district of Virginia found this claim
had no merit because the trial attorney had adequately investigated the
statement. Id. at 1284-85. Correll did not raise this issue in the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, but did raise an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim regarding waiver of his right to a jury trial. Id. at 1285.
8 Correllv. Thompson, 872 F.Supp. 282,291,293 (W.D. Va. 1994).
9451 U.S. 477 (1981).
10 Correll,63 F.3d at 1289, 1291. The court ruled against Correll's
cross-claims that the district court had erred in: 1) failing to conclude that
Correll was denied effective assistance because counsel misled the trial
court concerning the reason for Correll's waiver of his right to trial by

The Fourth Circuit's ruling was based largely on the lack of
evidence as to what occurred at the polygraph session:
although the record indicates that the polygraph examiner
told Correll that his response to a question ...indicated
deception, there [was] a complete dearth of information in
the record concerning the circumstances surrounding
Correll's decision to submit to the polygraph examination
or any further information pertaining to the timing or
events surrounding the disclosure of the results. Correll
simply failed to develop these facts during the state court
14
proceedings.
The court found the lack of a record crucial because "not all
statements made by a defendant [after ] [the disclosure of polygraph
results] can be deemed to be the result of the interrogation." 15
The court set out two hypothetical situations in which it would
not "necessarily" find that the police had initiated the contact: 1) if
Correll had requested the polygraph and validly waived his rights
before taking the test, any disclosure of the results would not be
interrogation conducted without a valid waiver of rights, or 2) if
Correll was told of the results by the examiner early in the day and
he requested to speak with Officer Overton that evening at the
Frederick County Jail, Correll's third statement might not be a
"response" to interrogation. 16
One lesson to be learned from Correll is that the government
must be held to its burden of proof at trial. The burden of proof is
upon the government to prove that a suspect has waived his Miranda
rights. 17 A waiver of rights will not be assumed by the mere
existence of a confession. 18 However, a trial court's finding of
waiver is very difficult to reverse, and the habeas petitioner challenging a confession is at a disadvantage for three reasons.
First, the petitioner has the burden of proof to show that the
confession was improperly admitted. Second, in federal court, the
state courts' findings of fact are presumed correct. 19 Finally, if the
petitioner is deemed to have received a "full and fair hearing" in
state court, he will not be entitled to a separate evidentiary hearing
in federal court absent a showing of cause and prejudice. Therefore,
generally, a habeas petitioner is relegated to accepting the fact

jury and failed to adequately apprise Correll of the consequences of
waiver of the right; 2) applying the § 2254(d) presumption of correctness
to the factual findings of the state habeas court concerning Correll's
ineffective assistance of counsel claims; 3) holding that Correll's claim
of denial of due process of law was procedurally barred. Id. at 1292-93.
These claims were relatively unimportant compared to Correll's confession law claims. Therefore, they will not be discussed further in the
summary.
11 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
12
Edwards,451 U.S. at 485-86.
13
Correll,63 F.3d at 1287.
14
1d. at 1287-88.
15
Id. at 1287. Although the Fourth Circuit did not rule out that the
polygraph itself or the relaying of the results to Correll may have been
interrogation, it found insufficient facts to make that determination in
Correll's case.
161Id.
17 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
18
Tague v. Louisiana,444 U.S. 469 (1980).
19 Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985)(interpreting 28
U.S.C. §2254(d)(1966)).
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findings of the state courts and will not be allowed to further develop
20
facts in federal court.
In Correll's case, the failure to adequately develop facts in the state
courts was fatal to his confession law claim. 2 1 The Fourth Circuit noted
the "complete dearth of information in the record" regarding the events
surrounding the polygraph examination and found that Correll had not
upheld his burden as a habeas petitioner to prove the inadmissibility of
the confession.22 In addition, because the court found that Correll was
given a full and fair hearing in the state courts, a federal habeas
evidentiary hearing, in which he might develop further facts, was not
available to him.23 Therefore, based upon the incomplete facts in the
record, the Fourth Circuit stated that it could not find that the trial court
had erred in finding that Correll had initiated the questioning leading to
the third confession. 24
The message in Correllis clear: to preserve Edwards issues, trial
and state habeas practitioners must put in the record all evidence of lack
of waiver and of the circumstances surrounding an initiation of conversation after an invocation of rights. Unless evidence is presented at the
state level, the federal courts will not later be able to consider it absent
compelling reasons.
H. The Issue of Taint and the Third Confession.
The district court also had granted the writ for habeas corpus on the
alternative ground that the third confession was tainted by the first and
second inadmissible confessions and was, therefore, also inadmissible.
The Fourth Circuit, however, reversed, finding that the first and second
confessions did not taint the third confession.25
The Fourth Circuit faulted the district court for not reviewing the
voluntariness of the first two confessions as part of its taint analysis. The
Fourth Circuit relied upon a recent Supreme Court case, Davisv. United
States 2 6 which held that a violation of Edwards is a technical violation
ofMiranda,rather than a core Fifth Amendment violation.27 The court
20

Correll,63 F.3d at 1288. (citing Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504
U.S. 1, 8-12 (1992)). Correll did not argue that cause and prejudice
existed or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from
denying him ahearing. Id.The possibility ofcause and prejudice will not
be considered if the petitioner fails to argue any exist. Teague v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288, 298 (1989).
21 Failure to develop facts pre-trial or at trial which support the
suppression of evidence may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
But, since admission of Correll's third confession was deemed harmless
error by the Fourth Circuit, Correll could not show prejudice resulting
from ineffectiveness nor from lack of evidence at the hearing.
22
Correll,63 F.3d at 1288.
23
Id. at 1288 (citing Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 8-12
(1992)).
24
d. at 1288, 1293.
25
Id. at 1289.
26 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2354-55 (1994).
27
Correll, 63 F.3d at 1290.

noted thatDavis had stated that, "The prohibition on further questioning
of a suspect who has invoked his right to counsel set forth in Edwards,
"like other aspects of Miranda[,] is not itself required by the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition on coerced confessions...-"28
By characterizing Edwards as a "technical" rather than a constitutional rule, the court was able to invoke the United States Supreme
Court's ruling in Oregon v. Elstad.29 Elstad had held that a mere
Miranda violation (i.e. a statement that was "voluntary" in a Fifth
Amendment sense, but given without proper Miranda warnings) could
be cured by later Mirandawarnings. Thus, the Fourth Circuit reasoned,
an earlier Edwards violation could also be cured with subsequent
Miranda warnings if the earlier statements were "voluntary."
The Fourth Circuit reviewed the facts found by the trial court, and
determined de novo that Correll's confessions were voluntary as a matter
of law in accordance with Millerv. Fenton.30 The court stated that"[t]he
only factor militating toward a finding that these confessions were
involuntary [was] Correll's [extremely low] I.Q. of 68 .... -31 Upon
determining that the first two confessions were voluntary, the Fourth
Circuit found that the third confession had followed valid Miranda
32
warnings and was untainted by the prior Edwardsviolations.
Correllmakes clear that the practitioner must vehemently argue
that any prior statements were given involuntarily in order to suppress a
subsequent statement taken in violation of Edwards.33 The Fourth
Circuit is likely to be the capital defendant's last chance. From the trial
forward, defense attorneys must address the issue and repeat the factors
"militating against a finding of voluntariness" as much as possible. If the
lower courts had addressed the issue and found the first and second
confessions involuntary, the Fourth Circuit would not have been able to
find so easily the earlier confessions voluntary and uphold the third
confession.
Summary and analysis by:
Angela Dale Fields
28

Id. (quoting Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Connecticut v.
Barrett,479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987))).
29 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
30
Correll,63 F.3d at 1290 (citingMiller,474U.S. 104,112 (1985)).
31
Id. at 1291. The court ignored the extensive questioning by the
police (Turnerv. Pennsylvania(1949)); the incommunicado detention
(Davisv. North Carolina(1966)); and the denial of counsel (Fayv. Noia
(1963)). Instead, the Fourth Circuit noted that Correll had a "streetwise"
nature; "more than a dozen" previous experiences with Miranda warnings; had been in custody "only" about seven hours before the first
confession; was not deprived of food or water, and was not subjected to
physical coercion, promises, or trickery. Id. at 1288.
32
1d. at 1294. Of course, the finding of harmless error would make
the taint issue irrelevant.
33
To his or her credit, either the trial attorney or the habeas hearing
attorney, orboth, put many factors in the record which would have helped
a court find that the confession was involuntary.

